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To the Dogs: Companion speciesism 







Introduction: Matter Matters 
 
Feminist productions in the fields of literary, cultural and social studies are 
almost exclusively – though for good reasons – informed by a radical 
constructivism. Drawing on discourse analysis and semiotics, such work 
relies predominantly on gender as a category of analysis in order to 
examine the social, cultural and psychic construction of subjectivity, while 
neglecting questions of biological sex. The general refusal of scholars 
from those disciplines to engage with the materiality of bodies, with their 
physiological, biochemical or microbiological details, forms and 
formations, is indicative of an anti-essentialist stance which is very 
understandable from a historico-political perspective: When politicians 
and scientists have for centuries recurred to “natural” (because biological) 
differences to explain and legitimate social discrimination, oppression and 
inequality between the sexes and between human beings of different 
classes and ethnicities, it was more than necessary to counter, if not 
downright deny, biologistic argumentations. Meanwhile, however, the 
hostile attitude towards the natural sciences and empirical research has 
“naturalised” itself and the socio-cultural framing of bodies and gender 
has simply become the counterpart of the ideology known as biological 
reductionism, insofar as influences of the environment and society as well 
as individual technologies of the self count as the determining factors now 
that, in their turn, can be acted upon by the feminist subject. 
 As a consequence of this disciplinary division of labour, scientific 
debates between and within different academic fields remain trapped in 
the dead-end street of the dualisms nature/culture, 
essentialism/constructivism, materiality/discourse and sex/gender. Judith 
Butler’s attempt (in Gender Trouble and even more so in Bodies that 
Matter) to dissolve the sex/gender dichotomy by negating the preceding 
materiality of gender or, conversely, by postulating sex as a discursive 
and performative construct, is not particularly fruitful for transdisciplinary 
models of explanations and research questions beyond the nature/culture 
or nature/nurture divide.i I am not arguing for the abandonment of the 
(de)constructivist method in gender studies – on the contrary: as I will 
argue in more detail later, I would like to foster a much broader and 
literally deeper understanding of the constructedness of bodies as 
“material”. This understanding would result in an approach that balances 
the overemphasis of discursive analyses not only by including aspects of 
bodily (self-)experience, how bodies are present in space and time, and 
the social practices of the corporeal, but also brings in the weight of 
biological dimensions in the construction of subjectivities – without, 
however, reinforcing naturalist-essentialist assumptions. If this 
engagement with corporeal material(ities) fails to take place in gender 
studies, then, as feminists from various research cultures have 
emphasised for over a decade now, feminism runs the danger of playing 
into the hands of a regressive politics. According to Elizabeth Wilson, 
whom I quote here as a representative of a growing number of 
proponents of a new materialist feminism, feminist scholars should give 
up this anti-biologistic and broadly anti-technoscientific stance precisely in 
order to keep feminist theory progressive and differentiated: 
 
if our critical habits and procedures can be redirected so that 
biology and neurology are not the natural enemies of politics – that 
is, if we defer gender theory from the start – then we will find a 
greater critical productivity in biology than theories of gender would 
lead us to believe.ii 
 
With her call Wilson aims above all to encourage feminists to trace the 
critical potential for challenging and deconstructing the taken-for-granted 
stability of material structures and the unchangeability of what is 
presumably given within the natural sciences. Her book Neural 
Geographies thus presents an invitation to feminists „to envisage the 
possibility that neurology may already enact and disseminate the 
malleability, politics, and difference that they ascribe only to 
nonneurological forces”.iii With the help of new research findings in the 
natural sciences, Wilson counters the orthodox view that nature/sex is 
unchangeable and that, hence, an intervention in those areas of research 
is futile for a feminist politics of social transformation; the true target for 
feminist resistance, so the accompanying story goes, is via counter 
discourses, alternative images and narratives on the level of 
culture/gender – even though it is obvious how stubbornly stereotypical 
hetero- (and homo-)normative representations of gender and gender 
roles persist in the media, in the arts, in literature and, last but not least, in 
daily life. Thus, instead of wasting feminist energies in debates that 
revolve around the question whether either sexual difference explains 
why girls cannot think abstractly and therefore do not choose to study for 
a degree in mathematics, for example, or whether this choice is not 
ultimately determined by traditional patterns in education, we should 
rather begin to think differently about nature, biology, the body and 
materiality. Wilson’s term gut feminismiv for these alternative approaches 
joins a growing number of studies that I consider as examples of a new 
feminist materialism or “neo-materialism”. This latter term is used by Rosi 
Braidotti for her Deleuze-influenced nomadic philosophy in which radical 
immanence figures as a central concept: “a deeply embedded vision of 
the embodied subject. … it compasses the body at all levels, also, and 
especially, the biological body”.v 
 One of the pioneers of a new materialist-feminist direction in 
gender studies, molecular biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling, has 
convincingly shown that with regard to the construction of sexuality, 
categories of difference do not only inscribe themselves on the surface of 
bodies, but go literally beneath the skin: “events outside the body become 
incorporated into our very flesh.”vi  At every moment of one’s lifespan, 
socioculturally-shaped behavioural patterns as well as reactions of the 
neural system to external signals affect one’s muscles, bones, nerves and 
even the architecture of one’s cells. In other words, cells are in a never-
ending process of (re)formation and enter into material relations with their 
internal environment (affecting the very inside of a system/body) as well 
as its external environment or outside (influencing cultural practices, 
norms and values of a society).  Given these dynamic processes, it does 
not make sense any longer – if ever it really made – to oppose nature to 
culture as contenders in shaping bodies and subjectivities. Rather, as 
Fausto-Sterling proposes, we should talk of a “biocultural systems in 
which cells and culture construct each other”.vii Already the choice of the 
word system implicitly signals a shift in paradigm from a reductionist 
towards a system-oriented thinking that can be observed for quite some 
time already within biology. As I hope to show later with recourse to so-
called Developmental Systems Theory, to adopt the central premises of a 
systems approach would also be fruitful for feminist gender studies and 
cultural analysis more broadly as well as for the forging of truly 
interdisciplinary or, rather, transdisciplinary research projects. 
 Systems theory, as well as feminist neo-materialism, introduce 
concepts and topics into gender and cultural studies that do not, at first 
sight, have anything to do with the human species nor directly touch upon 
gender or the woman question but could enrich feminist theorising and 
sharpen the argumentation of all emancipatory movements. Among such 
seemingly inappropriate themes I clearly favour the “animal question” (in 
analogy to and critique of Heidegger’s focus of the question of being as 
the question of technology) which I consider as having the greatest 
theoretical as well as political potential of fundamentally redirecting the 
humanities and which, for this very reason, is placed at the centre of the 
present essay. 
 More concretely, this essay follows the imperative to engage 
concepts and theories from the life sciences in order to revise dominant 
posthumanist paradigms. I find – and this might seem slightly provocative, 
even though I certainly do not want to put poststructuralist feminism and 
certain tendencies of posthumanist theory on the same qualitative and 
political footing – that a feminism that focuses almost exclusively on the 
sociocultural construction of gender and gender roles similarly 
impoverished as a posthumanism that can only imagine the hybridity of 
human existence in the figure of the cyborg and endeavours to separate 
the material body from the immaterial mind to gain heroic invulnerability, 
perfection and immortality. After my critique of what is currently referred to 
as “cybernetic” or “popular” posthumanism, I will present the anti-
speciesist approaches literary critic Cary Wolfe has developed in line with 
Jacques Derrida’s thinking of the animal as well as briefly introduce the 
new manifesto of biologist and historian of science Donna Haraway. I 
conclude with a modest proposal directed mainly at scholars from the 
humanities to give up their largely anthropocentric stance and participate 
in the building of the posthumanities by drawing on yet another paradigm 
shift that currently marks a number of fields; i.e., the shift from questions 
of being to questions of becoming. 
 
Posthumanism has gone to the dogs 
 
In many respects, my contention (that posthumanism has gone to the 
dogs) is both correct and false. As a part of postmodernist anti-humanist 
movements of thought and poststructuralist theory, posthumanism first 
appeared on the academic stage in the late 1960s, primarily in literary 
departments of North America. Its philosophical roots, however, can be 
traced back to European thinkers Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin 
Heidegger. After Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God in Die 
fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science, 1882), Heidegger’s Brief über 
den Humanismus (Letter on Humanism, 1947) in particular can be seen 
as the initiator of the post/humanism debate that then received a new and 
powerful impetus with Michel Foucault’s wager, proposed in the final 
sentence of his book Les Mots et les Choses (The Order of Things, 
1966), that “man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge 
of the sea.”viii The phenomenon “posthumanism“ was initially noticed with 
a certain “helplessness“ix and met with resistance but increasingly gained 
respect due to its radical critique of traditional humanism and civilisation. 
Meanwhile, attempts such as those by US-American political scientist 
Francis Fukuyamax to reinforce the belief in an essential human nature 
are seen as “helpless“ responses to the crisis of modernity and – rightly, I 
think – classified by many as reactionary contributions to the 
post/humanism debate. Posthumanist thought, posthumanist art and 
posthumanist bodies by contrast are considered to be progressive, cool 
and sexy. We have thus not seen the end of posthumanism yet; 
posthumanism has gone anything but to the dogs. 
 And yet it seems to me that posthumanism casts quite a poor 
figure: its formula has become something of a cliché and bites its own tail. 
When I speak of the posthumanist formula, I mean the grand narrative of 
technological and cultural progress that leads from hierarchical 
differentiation in traditional humanism, which is strongly associated with 
the Enlightenment, to at least the possibility and “active utopia” of non-
hierarchical difference in posthumanism. My discontents with this story 
rests less on the somewhat banal observation that the androcentric, 
ethnocentric and anthropocentric premises of traditional humanism are 
not dead yet, but on the observation that these premises are also 
haunting narrations that purport to be anti- or post-humanist, be it 
literature, film or the arts and the sciences more broadly. To put it 
schematically: posthumanist texts are often all too humanist. 
 This should come as no surprise either. N. Katherine Hayles 
already shows in her genealogy of the posthuman, that it was no 
coincidence that the posthumanist redefinition of human nature or, to be 
precise, the definition of what she labels  cybernetic posthumanism, 
happened during and after the second World War: at a time of general – 
but especially male – anxiety and insecurity, the visions that Norbert 
Wiener and others presented at the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics 
between 1943 und 1954 were aimed not only towards providing a position 
of dominance and control to the humanist subject in crisis but also to 
bring order and stability into chaos with the help of an information theory 
that was strongly based on the principle of homeostasis.xi Hayles regards 
the posthumanist paradigm, developed during this time and radicalised 
over the next decades as a kind of world-view that is premised on four 
major assumptions: (1) “Life“ does not inevitably depend on being 
embodied in a biological substrate; i.e. information triumphs over 
materiality; (2) (self-)consciousness is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
the evolutionary history of humankind and quite insignificant with regard 
to human nature and identity; (3) the human body is a prosthesis and can 
thus be extended and its parts replaced ad infinitum; (4) intelligent 
machines are the „natural“ descendants of homo sapiens.xii This latter 
point finds one of its most prominent proponents in Hans Moravec in 
whose “family history” robots figure as the “mind children” of human 
beings, “built in our image and likeness, ourselves in more potent form”.xiii 
The description is characteristic of the desire of cybernetic posthumanists 
to maximise and perfect the human in a modular fashion. Even though 
cybernetic posthumanism contributes to the deconstruction, decentring 
and fragmentation of Enlightenment notions of the unitary and 
autonomous subject, its vision of a disembodied or postbiological future is 
ultimately but the continuation and reinscription of the Cartesian tradition 
of thought in new discursive clothes. 
 The above version of posthumanism, which Hayles considers a 
“nightmare“xiv and which is referred to in cultural criticismxv as “popular 
posthumanism,” is diametrically opposed to the attempt of a growing 
number of theoreticians to forge a critical posthumanism or, as Stefan 
Herbrechter and Ivan Callus have proposed recently, a 
metaposthumanism, with the prefix “meta-“ signalling a critically-distanced 
stance and not a totalising one (as in metaphysical thought); namely: 
“theory's disposition to step back from the general breathless excitement 
over the digital, the cybernetic, and the technologically prosthetic to cast a 
sober eye over posthumanist orthodoxy.”xvi 
 What is equally sobering, however, is the fact that the most radical 
metaposthumanists (and the humanities more broadly) do not quite 
manage to make an epistemological break with liberal humanism, insofar 
as their writing is also marked by an unquestioned “speciesism”; i.e., in 
the definition of ethicist Peter Singer who popularised the term three 
decades ago in his book Animal Liberation, “a prejudice or attitude of bias 
in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against 
those of members of other species.”xvii Both postcolonial, feminist and 
queer theories and discussion of subjectivity, identity, and difference as 
well as the claims on the right to freedom by new social movements have 
recourse to an Enlightenment concept of the subject whose conditio sine 
qua non is the absolute control of that subject over the life of nonhuman 
others/objects. The rhetorical strategy of radically separating non-white, 
non-male and non-heterosexual human beings from animals in order to 
have the subject status of these members of the human species 
recognised was and is successful and also legitimate – given that the 
racist, sexist and homophobic discourse of animality or an animalistic 
„nature“ has hitherto served to exclude most individuals of those groups 
of people from many privileges – but the speciesist logic of the 
dominance of human animals over nonhuman animals has remained in 
place. If we fight racism and (hetero)sexism because we declare 
discrimination on the basis of specific and identifiable characteristics – 
such as “black“, “woman” or “lesbian“ to be wrong and unjust, then we 
should also vehemently oppose the exploitation, imprisoning, killing and 
eating of nonhuman animals on the basis of their species identity. 
Moreover, if our research and teaching as cultural critics endeavours to 
do justice to the diversity of human experience and life styles and feel 
responsible towards marginalised others, should we then not seriously 
think about Cary Wolfe’s question „how must our work itself change when 
the other to which it tries to do justice is no longer human?“xviii 
 Wolfe is not making a claim for animal rights here – at least not 
primarily. This is also why his book puns on “rites/rights“: Animal Rites is 
the intervention of the anti-speciesist cultural critic who scrutinizes the 
rituals that human beings form around the figures of animals, including 
the literary and cinematic enactments of cannibalism, monstrosity and 
normativity. Wolfe subsumes all of these stagings under the heading the 
discourse of species, with “discourse“ understood in the sense of Michel 
Foucault as not only a rhetoric but above all as the condition for the 
production and ordering of meaning and knowledge in institutions like 
medicine, the law, the church, the family or universities. In addition, Wolfe 
wants to sharpen our awareness that a speciesist metaphysics has also a 
deadly impact on human animals, especially because speciesism is 
grounded in the juridical state apparatus: “the full transcendence of the 
‘human‘ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal‘ and the animalistic, which in 
turn makes possible a symbolic economy in which we engage in what 
Derrida [calls] a ‚non-criminal putting to death‘ of other humans as well by 
marking them as animal.“xix  
 The dog lies buried in the singular: “The animal – what a word!”, 
Derrida exclaims:  “[t]he animal is a word, it is an appellation that men 
have instituted, a name they have given themselves the right and 
authority to give to another living creature [à l'autre vivant].” xx In order to 
problematise this naming, Derrida has created the neologism l'animot: 
I would like to have the plural of animals heard in the singular. […] 
We have to envisage the existence of ‘living creatures’ whose 
plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an 
animality that is simply opposed to humanity. […] The suffix mot in 
l’animot should bring us back to the word […]. It opens onto the 
referential experience of the thing as such, as what it is in its being, 
and therefore to the reference point by means of which one has 
always sought to draw the limit, the unique and indivisible limit held 
to separate man from animal.  
As I propose in what follows, this clearly defined caesura of the 
„anthropological machine”,xxi which according to Giorgio Agamben was 
already set in motion by the old Greeks and the messianic thinkers and 
then accelerated by scientific taxonomies and the birth of anthropology, 
can be bridged with the help of a zoontological approach and companion 
speciesism. 
 
Posthumanist zoontologies  
 The desperate cry of the historical person Joseph Carey Merrick (in the 
movie The Elephant Man of 1980), “I am not an animal! I am a human 
being! I...am...a man!” – for recognition of his human identity through 
which he claims his right to social integration and personal integrity, is 
very understandable and hurts. But his words nevertheless reflect the 
poverty of the humanist stance, insofar as traditional humanism can only 
secure the “proper” essence of humanitas via a rigid separation from 
animalitas.  If one reads the reports by the victims and witnesses of the 
tortures in the military prison of Abu Ghraib, it seems to me that it is 
precisely the continued insistence and reinforcement of the animal-human 
boundary that legitimises the committed atrocities:  
 
Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, … 
and … bark like a dog and they were laughing at me … One of the 
police was telling me to crawl … A few days before [this], … the 
guy who wears glasses, he put red woman's underwear over my 
head … pissing on me and laughing on me … he put a part of his 
stick … inside my ass … she was playing with my dick … And they 
were taking pictures of me during all these instances. … [Another 
prisoner] was forced to insert a finger into his anus and lick it. He 
was also forced to lick and chew a shoe. … He was then told to 
insert his finger in his nose during questioning … his other arm in 
the air. The Arab interpreter told him he looked like an elephant. 
[They were] given badges with the letter ‘C’ on it.xxii  
 The US soldiers reduce their prisoners to their corporeal being, to animal 
being, and then make fun of this “bare life“xxiii Instead of accepting their 
own vulnerability and mortality that they share with their victims as well as 
with other living beings, the torturers use the “systematic bestialization“xxiv 
of the prisoners to strengthen their own sense of freedom and autonomy 
and to concomitantly withdraw the right to protection guaranteed by the 
humanitarian rights of the Geneva Conventions; after all, as barking dogs, 
crawling insects and ‘elephant men’, these ‘creatures’ cannot respond to 
the name, the word, the interpellation “human.“ 
 The implicit and explicit analogies between racism, sexism, 
homophobia that accompany the above description of the torture 
methods, confirm that the power of the “discourse of species” to affect 
human others depends on the prior acceptance of the institution 
“speciesism;” i.e. on taking for granted that the inflicting of pain and the 
killing of nonhuman animals by human animals does not constitute a 
criminal act but, on the contrary, is legal. This is why Derrida speaks of 
the “carnophallogocentrism“xxv of Western metaphysics. And here Wolfe’s 
argument comes full circle:  
 
[Since] the humanist discourse of species will always be available 
for use by some humans against other humans as well, to 
countenance violence against the social other of whatever species 
– or gender, or race, or class, or sexual difference. . . we need to 
understand that the ethical and philosophical urgency of 
confronting the institution of speciesism and crafting a 
posthumanist theory of the subject has nothing to do with whether 
you like animals. We all, human and nonhuman alike, have a stake 
in the discourse and institution of speciesism; it is by no means 
limited to its overwhelmingly direct and disproportionate effects on 
animals.xxvi  
 
 Wolfe’s own analytical tool for what is a decidedly anti-speciesist 
strand of posthumanist thinking is zoontology, a term that is both fully 
deconstructive of Enlightenment anthropocentrism and simultaneously 
self-deconstructing: on the one hand, the term signifies the recognition 
that animals (zoon is Greek for ‘animal’) are worthy of ontological 
investigation or, put differently, that ontology is not just about the ontology 
of the human. On the other hand, however, the term makes it clear that 
taking the question of the animal seriously calls into question the very 
being (that is, the ontology) of ontology itself; in other words, ontology is 
itself revealed to be a humanist approach to ethics and politics.xxvii
xxviii
 Being 
fundamentally humanist, a purely ontological approach seems to be 
incommensurable with an anti-speciesist posthumanist theorising that 
should also do justice to various ‘species’ of human beings. Based on 
these premises, Wolfe calls for a more intensive philosophical encounter 
with the material and multiple embodiments of the subject rather than a 
continued concern with “anthro-ontological” questions about the nature or 
identity of “Man”.  This shift in focus would also imply a reopening of 
the question of ethics and humanism (and posthumanism) that places 
what Derrida calls “the living in general“xxix at the centre of critical 
attention. Moreover, this new emphasis would have the humanities 
engage the question of animal rights (and rites) in order to precisely 
discuss issues of sameness/identity and difference with regard to human 
beings outside humanist parameters. With The Companion Species 
Manifesto (CSM), Donna Haraway joins this critical-posthumanist project 
and has – quite literally – gone to the dogs. 
 
 
Revisions of feminist slogans: from “Cyborgs for earthly survival!” 
to “Run fast; bite hard!”xxx 
 
The central question of Haraway, whose socialist and feminist “Cyborg 
Manifesto” has been highly influential in various academic disciplines and 
beyond, is the following: „how might an ethics and politics committed to 
the flourishing of significant otherness be learned from taking dog-human 
relationships seriously”.
xxxii
xxxi In the age of technoscience, cyborgs can no 
longer guide us, it seems: “I appropriated cyborgs to do feminist work in 
Reagan’s Star Wars times of the mid-1980s. By the end of the 
millennium, cyborgs could no longer do the work of a proper herding dog 
to gather up the threads needed for critical inquiry.”  
 Haraway’s “dog writing” begins – as many of Haraway’s stories – 
with a personal and quite intimate confession:  
 
Ms Cayenne Pepper continues to colonize all my cells – a sure 
case of what the biologist Lynn Margulis calls symbiogenesis. […]
 I'm sure our genomes are more alike than they should be. 
There must be some molecular record of our touch in the codes of 
living that will leave traces in the world, no matter that we are each 
reproductively silenced females, one by age, one by surgery. Her 
red merle Australian Shepherd's quick and lithe tongue has 
swabbed the tissues of my tonsils, with all their eager immune 
system receptors. Who knows where my chemical receptors 
carried her message, or what she took from my cellular system for 
distinguishing her self from other and binding outside to inside? 
We have had forbidden conversation; we have had oral 
intercourse; […] We are training each other in acts of 
communication we barely understand. We are, constitutively, 
companion species. We make each other up, in the flesh.xxxiii 
 
The exchange of organic tissue between the woman Donna and the dog 
Cayenne, as well as the assumption inherent to this manifesto that 
humans and dogs co-evolved, are indeed very good examples of the 
mentioned Lynn Margulis’ thesis, insisted upon again in her recent book 
Acquiring Genomes (co-authored with her son Dorion Sagan) that “we 
people are really walking assemblages, beings who have integrated 
various other kinds of organisms”.xxxiv Known as endosymbiosis or 
symbiogenesis, Margulis’ theory presents an alternative to the Darwinist 
idea of the so-called modern synthesis according to which biodiversity 
and the emergence of new species in the course of evolution stems from 
the natural selection of random gene mutation. For many decades 
already and rejecting the militaristic and capitalist rhetoric of survival of 
the fittest, Margulis has defended the thesis that the eukaryotic cells of 
plants and (non)human animals owe their existence to prokaryotic 
(nucleus-free) bacteria which “devoured” each other millions of years ago: 
new types of cells and organs, and even new species, evolved, first, 
through the mutually parasitic co-habitation of bacterial cells and, later, 
through the exchange of genetic material between different living entities. 
In other words, biological newness and growing complexity is the result of 
absorbing genes that did not originally belong to a system but are then a 
permanent component in the genome of the life form. As organisms who 
have always already “alien” material in their flesh and blood, “we” are not 
the autonomous and self-contained individuals of modernity who can 
fashion themselves in their own image and are separate from other living 
entities. 
The simple fact that human beings are above all organic and mortal 
bodies as well as the observation that “multidirectional gene flow – 
multidirectional flows of bodies and values – is and has always been the 
name of the game of life on earth,”xxxv provided Haraway with additional 
reasons for abandoning her alter ego, the cyborg, and for convincing her 
readers that dogs might be the better guides through the thickets of 21st-
century technobiopolitics. Haraway’s intensive attention to dogs – she 
and Cayenne train each other for participation in agility competition – 
does not mean, however, that the figure of the cyborg has completely lost 
its usefulness as a feminist model of analysis; widening Margulis’ notion 
of symbiogenesis, we may say that cyborgs are companion species, too, 
who live together with human beings in a kind of “symbiotechnogenesis”. 
Organic and technical companion species form a ‘family’ of material-
semiotic figures that should help us in formulating posthumanist 
alternatives to discriminating and humanist and strictly dualistic definition 
of the human and of male/female. Beyond romancing the relation 
between animal and human, also beyond an uncritical technophilia, and 
in the interest of a radically democratic politics, Haraway urges us to 
embrace positive configurations of the unavoidably close encounters 
between humans, animals, machines, and various hybrids in a 
technoscientific era in order to react quickly and effectively to negative 
and predominantly neoliberal discourse – run fast, bite hard. 
Articulating a critique of the subject of classical humanism and 
modernity does not necessarily have to be synonymous with declaring the 
death of the human subject in an irresponsible postmodernist spirit. In the 
age of globalised technoscience, the apocalyptic discourse of the “end of 
man” needs to be reconsidered precisely in the name of humanity and 
human rights. To counter this prevalent rhetoric, however, one does not 
have to remain within the liberal-humanist tradition of separating “I“ from 
“world“, nor follow the moral-philosophical stance as “cultivated“xxxvi by 
Martha Nussbaum, for example, but to contribute to a culture that 
accentuates processes of transcorporeality and in which human beings 
are not (in) the centre of the universe: human and non-human bodies are 
in constant exchange with each other and with their environment; they 
constitute each other through relationality and dynamic interactions. 
The above premise is the starting-point of Developmental Systems 
Theory (DST), which I include as a branch of neo-materialism: with regard 
to the development of biological system, DST rejects gene fetishism or 
biological determinism, but does not privilege the influence of the 
environment on the system neither, as if each system was a tabula rasa; 
rather, DST insists that a (re-)combination of genes within a system and 
environmental factors that impact on the system from without, co-produce 
a unique and, above all, an incalculable result. This perspective enables a 
thinking beyond the dead-end street of nature-versus-culture without 
abandoning the interpretative paradigm of constructivism. Biological 
beings are indeed ‘constructed’ but, as Susan Oyama, who coined the 
term DST, observes: 
 
not only in the sense that they are actively and discursively 
construed by themselves and others, but also in the sense that 
they are, at every moment, products of, and participants in, their 
own and others’ developmental processes. They are not self-
determining in any simple sense but they affect and ‘select’ 
influences on themselves by attending to and interpreting stimuli, 
by seeking environments and companions, by being susceptible to 
various factors, by evoking reactions from others.xxxvii  
 
     The politically and ethically relevant potential of DST consists in the 
argument that system and environment condition each other: power, 
control and agency do not reside with either side, neither with the self nor 
with the other, but prove to be multiple and distributed. What we 
experience as “I” is thus a self that was and continues to be fashioned in 
a relational process that is not grounded in a negative difference between 
self and other – be it nature, an animal or a human being of a different 
gender, ethnicity or religion, etc. By the same token, DST also strongly 
mitigates against a definition of information we encounter above all in 
Artificial Life and Artificial Intelligence research: information as a binary 
code of ones and zeros, a blue print, fixed programme or stable 
representation of what something or someone unavoidably and eternally 
is. A systemic and process-oriented approach opens up lines of research 
flights that do not only take genetic determination into account but also 
seriously attend to the economic, social and cultural factors in the 
emergence and evolution of bodies; a perspective that also shifts the 
analytical focus from being/Being to becoming. 
     This turn in thinking towards the dynamics and processuality of the 
world, reality and subjectivity has already been proposed by philosopher 
of science Alfred North Whitehead in a lecture series of 1927-28xxxviii and 
finds its continuation in the rhizomatic, molecular or nomadic philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari who have inspired further 
generations of thinkers and scholars of all tendencies. In the framework 
provided by philosophical nomadism, as Braidotti summarises, the human 
subject is “fully immersed in and immanent in a network of non-human 
(animal, vegetable, viral) relations”.xxxix In ethical and political debates this 
symbiotic embeddedness and embodiment of the human in a material 
network of complex and multiple relations as well as the continuity and 
mutual dependency between human and non-human environment needs 
to be taken into account much more than it has been hitherto: 
anthropocentrism needs to be abandoned and, as Braidotti urges, be 
replaced by “biocentric egalitarianism” and “trans-species solidarity” so 
that an attitude of ecological empathy and intimacy across the species 
barrier can be fostered which is also likely to impact positively on the 
relationship between the diverse members of the human species. 
 In all the approaches introduced so far the biological body is given 
agency: genetic mutation and evolution, for example, occurs through an 
organism’s adaptive response to its surrounding elements and its 
changes. The definition of corporeal matter as (co-)creative principle 
allows ridding also the sexual body (sex) of the passivity attributed to it in 
gender theory so far. For neo-materialist feminist research practices the 
sex/gender divide clearly loses its relevance and analytical potential. 
Instead, the “sexuality/sex nucleus” and the category of sexual difference 
– i.e. the material, sexualised structure of the subject, are given 
importance (again).xl This refocusing of sex and the celebration of 
sexuality in all its forms of expression seems particularly urgent in these 
days of patriarchal and homophobic conservatism which in the West 
shows itself in an enormous hostility to sex. When – probably as part of 
the backlash against new definitions of sexuality by homosexual, 
transsexual, transgender and other queer forces – reproductive, 
heterosexual sex and artificial reproduction without sexual intercourse is 
given priority in neoliberal, late-capitalist countries, then a space of 
jouissance needs to be reopened in critical theories. 
 In the pleasurable sexual act, humans literally become the animals 
they have always been, as Alphonso Lingis observes in a beautiful 
“zoopoetic” text: “When we … make love with someone of our own 
species, we also make love with the horse and the calf, the kitten and 
cockatoo, the powdery moths and the lustful crickets” and, when having 
an orgasm, "[o]ur impulses, our passions, are returned to animal 
irresponsibility”.xli Lingis’ perspective is diametrically opposed to Freud 
and followers: in accordance with its concomitant speciesist trajectory, 
Freudian psychoanalysis would interpret such fantasies of becoming-
animal as the manifestation of the “perverse” desire to blur the 
boundaries between human and animal, a perversion that could be cured 
therapeutically by taming the animalistic side of the human, by eradicating 
all that is not “purely” human. In the words of Braidotti: 
 
…non-human drives for multiple encounters, wild bodily motives, 
heightened sensory perception and unbridled sexual activity, have 
to be assimilated or incorporated into a well-organised and 
functioning organism and by analogy, into well-regulated and 
normal orgasms.xlii 
 
This mainstreaming of sexual acts corresponds to the central split 
Foucault identified in his history of sexuality at the onset of modernity in 
Western societies; i.e., the split between ars erotica and sciencia 
sexualis. Philosophical nomadism of Deleuze and Guattari provides an 
antidote to these scientific and phallogocentric discourses and normative 
constraints in that it cherishes desire as an affirmative and productive 
force. It is above all the concept of “becoming-animal” developed by these 
two thinkers that provides us with an altogether different way of viewing 
the human-animal relation. In contrast to Freud, Deleuze and Guattari do 
not attempt to domesticate and thus humanise the drives and fantasies 
that bring human beings closer to animals. For them, the domesticated 
human and nonhuman animals, the pets and female crickets on the 
hearth, belong to the category of oedipal animals.  
      The incitement to becoming-animal is often misunderstood: Deleuze 
and Guattari do not mean that human beings should really turn into 
animals or engage in sex with a dog. The idea is, rather, that while having 
sex our organs function like those of animals and, for the duration, 
manage to escape the organisational and stratificatory power of societal 
norms:  
 
Sexuality is the production of a thousand sexes, which are so 
many uncontrollable becomings. Sexuality proceeds by way of 
becoming-woman of the man and the becoming-animal of the 
human: an emission of particles. … Becomings-animal are 
basically of another power, since their reality resides not in an 
animal one imitates or to which one corresponds but in 
themselves, in that which suddenly sweeps us up and makes us 
become – a proximity, an indiscernibility that extracts a shared 
element from the animals far more effectively than any 
domestication, utilization, or imitation could: ‘the Beast’”. xliii 
 
Becoming-animal is thus not only a metaphor but an axis of transformation of the human 
and, thus, an appropriate paradigm to use in a critical-posthumanist and anti-speciesist 
theory that recognises that it is the animal (or the beast) within us that makes us “all too 
human”. Nietzsche’s postulate, as Diana Fuss argues, “syntactically locates at the center 
of the human some unnamed surplus – some residue, overabundance, or excess." Fuss 
adds that this excess “may be internal to the very definition of the human, an exteriority 
embedded inside the human as its own condition of possibility."xliv In this sense we have 
never been human but always already the kind of posthuman mixtures that modern bio 
and information technologies increasingly produce and that also grow in numbers in 
popular culture. The humanities will still have to develop the adequate concepts, models 
and methods for the analysis and ethical intercourse with those material-semiotic 
hybrids. But they should do so in dialogue with the technosciences. 
 
Afterword: Towards the posthumanities 
 
In this brief coda, I would like to parallel the growingly obvious kinship 
between animals, machines and humans to the hybridisation of 
knowledge production. To establish this analogy, I draw on sociologist of 
science Bruno Latour whose so-called “symmetrical 
anthropology“(anthropologie symmétrique)xlv offers and impressively 
enacts a method that does justice to the interactions and entanglements 
between nature, culture and representation and that provides useful 
categories for transdisciplinary research. Literature, the arts and other 
fields of the humanities are an extraordinary resource for qualitative, 
cultural and socially-acceptable developments of any modern knowledge 
society. However, in order for this enormous potential not be wasted but 
to become usable for dealing with pressing tasks and problems of the 
contemporary world, the traditional disciplines would have to morph into 
cultural studies. The required paradigm shift has already happened in 
many European institutes and is reflected in some of these places in their 
efforts to build bridges between the natural and humanistic sciences. I do 
not regard such efforts as a necessary strategy of survival, nor as 
chumming up to the “hard" sciences or bowing to their assumed authority 
– even though it is indeed my belief that the humanities only have a future 
if they collaborate with the technosciences or, just as the technosciences 
(and academia in general) need to rebuild themselves through 
transdisciplinary research programmes and projects involving artists and 
thinkers outside the university walls. As I hope to have demonstrated in 
this contribution and as my own engagement with biological and 
cybernetic systems theory as well as process philosophy has made me 
realise, we can find in disciplines like biology or the neurosciences new 
paradigmatic models for the revision of traditional concepts of gender, 
subjectivity and humanness by means of which the transformation of the 
humanities into the posthumanities could be accelerated. The 
posthumanities would above all be the home of post-anthropocentric and 
anti-speciesist cultural studies whose practitioners are aware that 
“culture“ is not “ours“ only but who nevertheless take responsibility for the 
consequences of human culture for nonhuman others – for their sake, for 
human’s sake and for the sake of retaining the meaning of humanity and 
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